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  1 
Edward Gibbon Wakefield, the liberal 
political subject and the settler state 
ABSTRACT 
Modern citizenship, with its exclusions and disaggregated freedoms, has a distinct 
genealogy in the state-formation of settler societies. Ethnic tensions and indigenous 
rights-claiming in many Anglophone states are frequently traced to their beginnings 
as settler societies. This is not only a legacy of the rights-claiming discourses of 
settlers, traced in individual national histories. It owes much to the formal body of 
literature that justified settler states not primarily as the embodiment of a nation but 
for the government of transnational populations. Using the writings of Edward 
Gibbon Wakefield and his contemporaries, this article examines the settler as a 
problem in British liberal thought. Wakefield’s unease about the settler as a political 
subject drew together three contemporary discourses, the critique of American 
society, post-Malthus thinking on poverty and the systematic colonization movement. 
For Wakefield, settler societies could only prosper through central planning, 
surveillance, and land price fixing, leading to class formation.  
 
I 
If the concept of citizenship continues to be regarded as uniquely European in origin, 
the intellectual history of European settler colonialism was one of transplanting that 
concept to outside of Europe and giving it a new purpose: to people the earth with a 
prosperous and well-governed population.
 
The ‘newness’ of this purpose and its 
implications for the institution of modern citizenship are the central concerns of this 
article. The ideologically assertive settlers who comprised this ‘Anglo-world’ shared a 
political language that crossed the boundaries of individual modern settler states, 
spanned the British empire, incorporated the United States and even reached beyond 
the frontiers of formal empire.
1
 Analysis on this scale can provide an intellectual 
history of the ways Anglophone settler state-formation in the 1830s and 1840s 
defined who could and who could not be a citizen and what citizenship comprised. 
Such a study provides a history of the legacies of inequality, racial hierarchy and 
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exclusion in the contemporary institution of citizenship as it is understood in the 
Anglophone world.  
 
Any study of how the Anglophone settler as a political subject was conceived raises 
methodological questions about how we understand the historical constitution of 
contemporary citizenship. The conception of ‘citizenship’ as a set of formal civil and 
political rights conferred through membership of a polity is useful, if problematic, for 
reflecting on the longer history of settler rights-claims and racial hierarchies, border 
regimes and the entrenched but limited democratic representation that comprises the 
formation of settler states.
2
 Methodologically, this article looks beyond this 
perspective to consider how the settler was conceived as a political subject.
3
 This term 
is used to convey not simply political participation but all of the ways in which people 
were or were not able to constitute themselves as being political in society. It provides 
a suitable medium for understanding the political belonging of the settler in the 
context of the indistinct, strained and multiple divisions between the metropole and 
emergent settler states. Moreover, it enables us to understand property rights and the 
franchise historically not simply as rights conferred on certain privileged types of 
people but also as tools of social engineering. In all, this approach enables an analysis 
of how Anglophone settler-societies were conceived in the traditions of British liberal 
thought and how such a conception provided intellectual foundations for the settler-
state’s legal and political discourses of exclusion. 
 
With reference to the ‘systematic colonization’ movement of the 1830s and 1840s and 
its most prolific theorist Edward Gibbon Wakefield, this article examines the central 
role of creating a society of independent, rights-bearing citizens in ensuring the 
prosperity of settler populations. The political subject that emerges is a vulnerable and 
precarious transmitter of European civilization that requires government regulation 
and surveillance to prosper. As Wakefield put it, ‘the barbarism of new countries 
[has] become my ruling idea.’4 Wakefield saw settler societies as a potential rather 
than an actual vehicle for European civilization. He approached them as a reformer or 
improver. This aspect of Wakefield’s argument provided an intellectual foundation 
for neo-European nation-building across the globe and for the marginalization of 
indigenous peoples that characterized the renewed white settler colonialism of the 
nineteenth century and beyond. Moreover, Wakefield’s unique position as a colonial 
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politician in Canada and New Zealand, an active colonial agent and a government 
adviser enables us to see the relationship of these theories to the business of 
establishing and governing settler colonies. 
 
The next section provides conceptual context for the central argument of the article. 
That is, in settler societies a key feature of citizenship was that it imbued its 
possessors with a right to own, control and govern the land they occupied. This 
created a tension, one which Wakefield thought he had identified and could solve. 
What Wakefield’s writings reveal is that ‘race’, ‘nation’, or even ‘culture’ were in 
themselves seen as inadequate for engendering responsible citizens.
5
 If citizens are 
the substance of an autonomous and prosperous polity, then the citizenly capacities 
and actions of a population must be ensured through social engineering. Crucially, it 
is the constitution of the settlers as political subjects capable of claiming and 
improving the land (of reinforcing territorial sovereignty), rather than their racial or 
cultural identity, that justifies the displacement and marginalization of indigenous 
peoples.
6
  This is the significance of the way the settler as a would-be citizen was 
conceived in Wakefield’s vision of the expansion of settler societies and their 
eventual establishment as independent states. 
 
The article will then elaborate how the works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield, a 
political economist, can be read for their framing of the settler and the analytical 
problems this approach creates. It locates Wakefield’s negative view of the settler as a 
political subject at an intersection between the critique of American society in the 
travel literature of the time, the post-Malthus literature on poverty and over-
population and the systematic colonization movement. In particular, it explains how 
Wakefield capitalized upon criticism of the leading theorist of systematic colonization 
in the 1820s, Robert Wilmot-Horton. An analysis of Wilmot-Horton’s ideas reveals 
why and how Wakefield rejected organized emigration of the unemployed and the 
vision of colonial society that justified it. The next section draws together Wakefield’s 
concept of the settler as a political subject, taking examples from his published oeuvre 
and unpublished correspondence. Prominence is given to those early texts that 
responded to existing discourses on colonization, The Letter from Sydney (1829) and 
England and America (1833). By attempting to build a new world that retained old 
world social divisions, Wakefield articulated an anxiety about the settler, one that 
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shaped humanitarian and governmental resistance to settler rights-claims in the 
decades preceding the granting of significant colonial autonomy in the 1850s.  
II 
The claims of the settlers to sovereignty lie at the root of those states that they 
succeeded to and those citizenship regimes that were constituted with them. The 
historical project of colonization, as it invokes race, as it reinterprets territoriality, as 
it constitutes a new kind of European political subject, must be understood beyond the 
confines of the history of individual nation states, postcolonial or not. As Andrea 
Smith notes there is a tendency to assume the ‘given-ness of settler states’ in 
discussion of contemporary indigenous politics.
7
 This is an effect of discourses about 
settlers themselves. The initial function of the settler is to physically displace 
indigenous peoples as the rightful occupier of the land, enabling the colonizer’s claim 
to territorial sovereignty.
8
 In this period claims by settlers against the metropole for 
the protection of their rights as British subjects further asserted the legitimacy of the 
settler state. An obvious example is the constitutional debate in the First New Zealand 
Parliament of 1854, articulated in terms of metropolitan protection of indigenous 
rights versus settler sovereignty.
9
 The teleology inherent in the narration of national 
histories asserts the claims to sovereignty of settler societies over indigenous 
populations and other claimants. To understand such claims and their contemporary 
relevance, one must trace their origins not only in the context of independent nation-
building but also that of the universalizing claims of both empire and ‘Anglo-Saxon 
civilization’. This is a key reason for studying authors such as Wakefield who 
navigated between these scales and transcended national or proto-national contexts.  
 
Central to this article is a distinction between the rights-claiming discourses of settlers 
themselves and the formal body of literature on the topic of systematic or planned 
colonization, meaning the selection and management of populations that could 
demonstrate citizenly capacity. The term referred to the selection and transportation 
of emigrants, together with the allocation and sale of lands in colonies through central 
planning and organization by or with the sanction of the state. The proportion of 
emigrants settled through systematic colonization was small, some 4% in its heyday 
of the 1830s and 1840s.
10
 Yet to dismiss the discourses it produced as mere rhetoric 
as James Belich does is to fail to integrate settler colonialism into the history of 
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mainstream political thought in a way that individual national histories can only ever 
do partially. That commentators as various as Robert Malthus, John Stuart Mill and 
Karl Marx wrote about systematic colonization is testament to its historic importance 
as a problem in nineteenth-century western political thought. A purely constitutional 
account, such as Belich provides, can underplay friction between government, settlers 
and other metropolitan agencies about what actions constitute or confirm rights 
claims. As Ann Laura Stoler has noted, colonization was not a hegemonic or unified 
project. To understand it historically in these terms is to overlook the class tensions 
and rival notions of civility that marked it.
11
 Boosters of colonization such as 
Wakefield were not primarily defenders of settler rights; rather, they were promoters 
of settler society as a tool of social and economic improvement.
12
   
 
In the literature on systematic colonization I discuss, the settler appears as a fragile 
and unreliable representative of the colonizer’s ideal of civilization.13 As Wakefield 
wrote in a prospectus for the colonization of New Zealand, ‘in general, a society 
transplanted from one of the densely-peopled countries of Europe, to one in which 
there was a wide extent of unoccupied land, has degenerated after its removal. Such a 
society commonly falls back into… that backward stage in the social progress when 
everyone, or nearly every one, is a cultivator on his own account.’14 Central planning 
became essential: ‘mere colonization’ was insufficient.15 Within the discourse of 
systematic colonization, the settler was often depicted as a figure that required 
surveillance in order to effectively carry out the aims of the metropolitan colonizing 
power. 
 
The discourse on systematic colonization thus complicates the history of the settler as 
a claimant of political rights, as a would-be citizen of either the metropole or some 
newly emergent settler-state. Paradoxically, a sense of political belonging is evoked 
on the one hand by the proto-nation and on the other by claiming the rights of the 
metropolitan subject. As Alan Lester and others have argued, a major aspect of the 
settler’s sense of common belonging comes from racial difference, from both 
indigenous peoples and slave or former slave population.
16
 Yet, such discourses 
contained contradictions. The discourse about settlers that Wakefield developed was 
not eulogistic. While it saw a necessity in representative government, it feared anomy, 
the tyranny of the majority and a general ‘loss of civilization’ in contrast to the 
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mother country. As a discourse rooted in political economy, it exposed the link 
between metropolitan discussions about the causes and effects of poverty on the one 
hand and the aspirations about European political institutions that underpin the project 
of settler colonialism on the other. Such a link, with all the tensions it implies, is the 
proper context in which to understand the settlers’ own claims to rights as British 
subjects and their eventual independence. In other words, it is apposite to ask what 
function Britishness played in how settler societies viewed themselves as ‘neo-
Britains’ or settlers as ‘neo-Britons’? 
 
Systematic colonization is a key moment in the history of liberal thought about 
societies outside of Europe and about what material elements made a prosperous, 
autonomous polity. The 1820s and 1830s, witnessed a discussion not about how 
societies could be improved through trade and industry but the limits of that 
improvement. Colonies of Britons were a kind of frontier for the liberal values of the 
metropole. Legally and politically, it was felt a society of Britons, wherever it was, 
must have legal protection of secure and transferrable property rights and a right to 
trial by one’s peers. Such rights were best protected by a representative government.17 
The American Revolution had demonstrated that the removal of such rights would be 
resisted and their protection would promote peace and economic prosperity. The 
defence of colonies on economic grounds now came with an assumption that such 
liberties must be secured. Lord Durham’s report of 1839 on the unrest in Upper and 
Lower Canada can be read as an assertion of the suitability of British settler colonies 
as sites of liberal improvement heralding a prosperous commercial society.
18
 Thus 
Wakefield, much like Tocqueville in Democracy in America, concerned himself inter 
alia with the problem of how settlers could constitute themselves as political subjects 
in such a way that would make their society prosper.  
 
It is primarily as a political economist, as a user of that language, that Wakefield has 
been and should be understood, as this best explains his understanding of the 
relationship between the political and civil rights of the citizen and the material 
prosperity of settler society.
19
 He saw himself as a significant contributor to a new 
phase in a debate about the benefits of colonies to their mother country that owes its 
immediate origins to Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776). Even the settler 
question principally concerned the best use of labour – not social improvement or 
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political order. Yet, this language carries a series of assumptions about the settler as a 
political being and the colony as a polity. It is not my intention to contribute to the 
established academic debate about the treatment of political questions in political 
economic thought.
20
 Rather, I argue that the classical discussion of colonization 
deploys a series of competing understandings about the settler as a political subject 
that are central to how European thought constructs the European subject and the non-
European other. 
 
 
III 
Wakefield is an important focal point for analysing the discourse of settler 
colonialism as a discourse about making citizens of a prosperous polity. From 1830 
onwards, Wakefield wrote about and was actively involved in the politics of the major 
British settler colonies in southern Australia, Canada and New Zealand. He served as 
an elected representative in the last two settlements and co-authored Lord Durham’s 
famous report, widely considered a blueprint for responsible government in the 
colonies. Prolific and influential, he wrote about the connections between settlers and 
their colonial metropole in a way that reveals the assumptions about race and 
entitlement to land that have made settler colonialism a discourse of exclusion. 
Wakefield’s critique of unplanned settler emigrations and what he called ‘the evils of 
lawless British colonization’ produced a vision of what was requisite for Britons to 
flourish in new societies.
 21
 Wakefield’s idea of settler society as a fragile carrier of 
European civilization and the planned society that would remedy it drew together two 
distinct discursive traditions that had developed by the 1820s. The first was a vision 
of the new world, largely inspired by the independent United States of America, that 
emphasized the freedom to prosper that a colony offered to Britons as citizens of an 
old country undergoing economic crisis.
22
 As will be seen, it was criticism of the 
United States and lessons to be gained from the history of failed colonies that helped 
Wakefield to imagine a new colonial society. The second was that of poverty relief 
through planned emigration, which had emerged during the economic and political 
unrest following the Napoleonic wars from 1815 onwards. Wakefield’s response to 
both helps us to understand why he presented the settler as a political subject in the 
way that he did. 
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If the American Revolution exposed the political pitfalls faced by European states 
possessing colonies, it also hinted at the great promise of colonists as self-reliant 
trading partners.  For contemporary advocates of colonization, the key to a colony’s 
success was the ability of its people to improve and exploit the land. As Adam Smith 
had written in The Wealth of Nations, ‘The colony of a civilized nation which takes 
possession either of a waste country, or of one so thinly inhabited that the natives 
easily give place to the new settlers, advances more rapidly to wealth and greatness 
than any other human society.’23 The source of improvement and of order was not 
then the colonizing power as such, but the settlers as its agents and as people whose 
presence, whose actions assert that power. Smith, like Thomas Jefferson, saw the 
potential greatness of settler society in a community of numerous small landholders.
24
 
 
The onus on the settlers themselves, the central concern of this article, has political as 
well as economic significance and would become a key problem in the discourse of 
systematic colonization. Politically, American independence was a positive example 
of a flourishing society built on the protection of individual liberty and a cautionary 
tale about the metropolitan dominance of the executive branch of government.
25
 
Whereas British commentators routinely described their administration of India as 
‘government by the sword’, political authority in the settler colonies had to lie not 
with a strong governor or entrenched social elites but with the settlers as political 
actors. Martial law or authoritarianism were seen as undesirable or temporary. Even 
those detractors whose works Wakefield’s American writings most resemble, Basil 
Hall and Fanny Trollope, saw a proud sense of freedom as central to the American 
character.
26
 
 
This discourse of liberty and of an approach to equality would shape the movement 
for ‘systematic colonization’. Planned transportation to the colonies promised a means 
of  relieving the poverty and widespread political unrest following the end of the 
Napoleonic wars. As Wakefield later said of the 1820s,  
… a maladministration of the English poor-law, and the 
increase of cottier tenures in Ireland, which have encouraged 
the growth of excessive numbers; the existence in short of a 
population superabundant in proportion to employment, or, at 
all events, a more humane disposition in the higher classes to 
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take an interest in the well-being of the common people, has 
gradually conquered a once-prevailing dislike to emigration.
27
  
 
The major advocate of systematic colonization in the 1820s was Robert Wilmot-
Horton, an under-secretary at the Colonial Office and ardent social reformer. Horton 
proposed that the growing numbers of ‘paupers’ (meaning poor, able-bodied and 
unemployed) in Britain could be relieved by planned emigration to the colonies 
funded by loans secured against the parish poor-rates.
28
 Unlike Wakefield, Horton not 
only hoped that the poor unemployed population could flourish in the colonies, his 
faith was sustained by the utopian strain in contemporary literature on North America. 
As he told Lord Palmerston in 1829, ‘I consider the United States as the type of the 
state of high promise and positive independence for the lower classes.’29 In his notes 
he identified Fanny Butler’s Journal (1835), as a useful source. The extract he quoted 
began: ‘None need be born to vice for none are condemned to abject poverty.’30 
Given a plot of land, Horton hoped that the families sent out to the colonies would 
prosper as small-holders, making the most of the extensive, cheap, cultivable land. 
Planning was the key. As Horton once remarked of his critics, ‘To Emigration carried 
on without system without information and without assistance I am as much opposed 
as they can be.’31 As with Wakefield, the purpose of systematic colonization was to 
establish an optimal new society of Europeans informed by observations about how 
such polities had worked in the past.  
 
It matters that Horton identified systematic colonization with the unemployed poor. 
Horton’s first efforts to publicize colonization were through government committees 
on the poor laws.
32
 Horton enlisted major authorities on poverty to his cause, notably 
James Mill, Thomas Malthus and Robert Owen. He organized two waves of 
emigration from Ireland to Canada in 1823 and 1825. Horton’s scheme belongs to the 
same moment intellectually as Robert Owen’s Report to the County of New Lanark, 
which proposed to provide work for the unemployed through planned farm 
communities where manual labour would replace horse-drawn ploughs.
33
 Horton 
imagined a community of new world peasant proprietors. The utopian register of 
Horton’s plans was apparent to many contemporaries. Lord Palmerston, then 
Secretary of State for War, commented, ‘Nothing can be more charmingly seducing 
than your Picture of the back-settlements, it is a perfect Pays de Cockaigne, one longs 
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to sally forth with one’s axe and one’s hoe, chopping & burning & grubbing oneself 
from Pauperism into Competence.’34 Owen too felt that Horton’s vision of colonial 
society ignored human nature. Consistent with his writings, Owen criticized Horton 
for failing to account for the effect of one’s surroundings on one’s character: ‘you are 
in error upon these subjects; and necessarily so from want of the extensive practical 
experience in the operations and general affairs of society without an intimate 
knowledge of which no man can be prepared to legislate successfully for the country 
in its present anomalous condition.’35 This criticism of Horton’s scheme is significant 
because when Wakefield came to plan colonization none could accuse him of 
disregarding the question of how settlers as individuals would act together to create an 
enduring colonial society.
36
 
 
By the time Wakefield wrote, the low numbers of willing migrants and the high cost 
of labour in the colonies combined with ongoing political unrest in Britain led many 
to see the policy as a failure. As an Edinburgh Review article of 1840 observed of the 
period, ‘The remedy, with all its expenses and difficulties, was after all only a remedy 
for the day.’37 Critics often saw it as an unwelcome and unnecessary interference. As 
Maria Edgworth said to Horton regarding Irish emigration, ‘I am quite sure that in this 
Country there is no Landlord who would give £3 a head to assist the emigration of his 
tenants... I feel we must also be content sometimes to let ill alone, and let it work out 
its own cure, lest the interference might be worse than the disease.’38 It was generally 
felt that pauper transportation could only be a temporary cure. As a witness to the 
Poor Law Commission, Malthus had elaborated a common concern that planned 
emigration could only temporarily cure domestic unemployment.
39
 Systematic 
colonization had also failed to produce sufficient numbers to solve problems of labour 
shortage in the colonies.
40
 
 
For Wakefield, if the object was to create an economically prosperous polity, the 
wrong kind of people had been attracted to the colonies. The National Colonization 
Society, which Wakefield helped to found, established in 1830, imagined a new 
society built on the principles of the old country. An early meeting of the Society 
resolved: 
That it is desirable to relieve the Excess of Population in proportion 
to employment existing in this country, and, at the same time, to 
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supply the urgent demand for labour in the Colonies, by a well 
regulated system of Emigration. That the most efficacious mode of 
carrying onto effect these purposes of the Society is- 1. By a 
selection of Emigrants whereby the greatest amount of procreative 
power would emigrate at the least expense that is in the least number 
of persons. 2. By Concentration of Colonists; whereby through 
divisions of labour and consequent accumulation of wealth, the great 
amount of employment for emigrants would be secured. 3. By the 
Sale of unappropriated Land, whereby Emigration might be 
conducted free of cost to the State.’41 
 
This contained the essence of Wakefield’s vision of systematic colonization. ‘The 
greatest amount of procreative power’ as the Society’s prospectus explained meant 
young married couples – to ensure the natural increase of the population. The second 
element targeted high labour costs and lack of capital investment in the colonies
42
. 
The third was an alternative to various systems of funding the colonists, including 
Horton’s. Together these three principles were intended to create a settler society that 
was self-sustaining and profitable to the mother country but also capable of creating 
an optimal European polity. Land, in Wakefield’s view, was too plentiful in the 
colonies; Horton’s systematic colonization created a society that could not sustain 
itself. Labourers soon became landowners, driving up the cost of labour and 
preventing the improvement of the land. Wakefield thought that the steady supply of 
cheap wage labour could be maintained by keeping land prices at a high ‘sufficient 
price.’ Artificial prices would also encourage the formation of different social 
classes, promoting the settlement of professionals as well as farmers. In Capital, 
Marx criticized Wakefield for creating a system for ‘the manufacture of wage-
labourers.’43 Crucially, the entire process would be overseen by the metropolitan 
government and paid for through taxation in the colony. In other words the settler’s 
presence was potentially unruly and required a very visible hand in the market. It is 
this aspect of Wakefield’s thought that will now be considered. 
 
III 
 
Wakefield’s vision of the means of establishing a new colonial order went beyond the 
original aim of establishing a new colony, and its success depended on the ability of 
the settler to become a productive member of the colony as a polity. It retained 
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Horton’s belief in systematic colonization at the expense of its core assumption: that 
mass-pauper emigration could enable a colony to prosper. Both Horton and Wakefield 
had seen proof of their schemes in the history of the United States, but where the 
former saw promise the later discerned a cautionary tale of rural egalitarianism. 
Wakefield continually returned to the problem of the individual settler’s weakness as 
a bearer of civilization. As he wrote, ‘The work of colonizing a desert bears a curious 
resemblance to that of transplanting full-grown trees. In neither case is it the ultimate 
object merely to remove; in both cases it is to establish; … in the latter case, the 
immediate object is to remove, not people merely, but society. In both cases equally, 
success depends upon attention to details.’44 To read Wakefield primarily as a 
contributor to political economy and principally as an author is to underestimate the 
great task of ‘transplanting’ not people but society that he set himself, evident in his 
care for urban planning, his minute control of emigration and his careful selection of 
settler causes to champion against the metropolitan government. 
 
For Wakefield, the keystone of successful colonization was central government 
regulation of who could own land. Crucially, Wakefield could not detach the political 
economic case for his scheme from a consideration of how the polity would order 
itself. As he observed in first book, the Letter from Sydney, ‘In all new countries the 
government alone has the power to dispose of waste land.’ He went on to ask, ‘Does 
it not follow that the government might, by restricting the amount of grants, establish 
and maintain the most desirable proportion between people and territory?’ 
Wakefield’s triumphant conclusion was that ‘Every new government, therefore, 
possesses the power to civilize its subjects’.45 This statement contains the double 
kernel of Wakefield’s thriving colony: effective land distribution and a prosperous 
and improving society. Wakefield was not content with the society of peasant 
proprietors imagined by Horton and on display in larger swathes of the contemporary 
Anglo-phone settler world. As will be discussed below, price-setting was a necessary 
intervention to encourage class-formation. 
 
While his major writings treat land price control as the fountainhead of societal 
development in a fledgling colonial society, his work to promote the New Zealand 
Company reveals a concern to carefully select the population. In a typical letter to 
John Robert Godley, the Company’s agent in Canterbury, he wrote: ‘The first body of 
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colonists… was made up by infinite painstaking. I could show you in detail that nine 
out of ten of them were nursed in becoming colonists, by educating them into a 
knowledge of the subject and a taste for the enterprise. If we had taken a quarter of 
the pains to rouse and cultivate mere speculation in land, the sale might have been 
very much greater. We deliberately discouraged what has heretofore been the 
mainspring of colonizing enterprise. We did this for the sake of the goodness of 
colonization.’46 Wakefield’s correspondence frequently alludes to the suitability of 
individual colonists, both before and after their arrival. Wakefield’s surveillance of 
colonial societies as they formed, most evident in the various New Zealand 
settlements, demonstrates the primacy of planning and control in his vision of colonial 
society.  
 
Wakefield’s writings continually examine how individuals within colonial society can 
combine politically in a way that will allow that society to prosper. Wakefield saw the 
social homogeneity of the colonies of his own time as the ultimate cause of their 
failure to develop. ‘I conclude,’ he noted in the Letter, ‘that the Australians will hate 
their parent country more bitterly, and at an earlier period, than did the British 
Colonists in America, because they will have greater facilities for growing up poor, 
ignorant, and democratical.’47 Distance from the metropole weakened bonds that 
would not be easily restored by affiliation to the new colony. In a letter to his agent 
Godley complaining of his settlers’ lack of loyalty, he wrote: ‘the ingratitude of the 
colonist if not proverbial, is an old story. Penn and Baltimore felt it deeply… 
Knowing how this colonial state of mind is caused, I do not quarrel with it... The 
feeling or want of feeling is a natural product of being engaged in the acquisition of a 
new country and a new nationality.’48 Wakefield like Basil Hall before him saw loose 
national bonds as a troubling but expected symptom of settler emigration, but this was 
not the worst symptom of distance from the metropole. 
 
The mind of the settler, deprived of varied company and bent only on agricultural 
pursuits would languish to the detriment of society in the colony. ‘We are in a 
barbarous condition,’ he said of Australia in the Letter, ‘like that of every people 
scattered over a territory immense in proportion to their numbers; every man is 
obliged to occupy himself with questions of daily bread; there is neither leisure nor 
reward for the investigation of abstract truth; money-getting is the universal object; 
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taste, science, morals, manners, abstract politics, are subjects of little interest, unless 
they happen to bear upon the wool question.’49 If dispersal was the great cause of high 
labour costs, its main effect politically was the erosion of the individual’s capacity to 
participate in the life of the polity. In his Principles of Political Economy, John Stuart 
Mill would later approve of Wakefield’s scheme, noting artificial prices acted as a 
‘check on the tendency of a population of colonists to disperse so widely as to adopt 
the tastes and inclinations of savage life.’50 Wakefield had thus established that the 
social and political benefits of civilization derived from urban settlement. 
 
When Wakefield came to describe the political incapacity of contemporary settlers, he 
resorted to the tropes of superstition and barbarism. Both had a strong lineage in 
eighteenth century discourse about modern European society, ascribing the limits of 
the mind to the way society was shaped by the environment (rather than an inherited 
biological disposition). The histories of David Hume, Edward Gibbon and William 
Robertson (to only name the most prominent British historians of the eighteenth 
century) saw barbarism and superstition as the hallmark of modern European 
society’s ‘others’ (whether that be ‘the orient’ or medieval Europe).51 Wakefield uses 
them in the same way, to imply an unacceptable deviation from political progress. As 
he wrote in England and America, ‘above two-thirds of the inhabitants of America 
pass the greater part of their lives in comparative loneliness... It is a state of 
existence… quite incomprehensible by those who have always lived in towns; but the 
Englishman, who shall conceive what it is, will be at no loss to account for many 
American habits and customs, besides that peculiar kind of superstition which 
displeases English travellers.’52 In eighteenth century discourse, the superstition trope 
has important political consequences because it makes individuals vulnerable to 
demagogy.
53
 The lack of political judgment stemming from dependency is a leitmotif 
of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, just as it was a common argument against 
the widening of the franchise.
54
 In this sense, the new society of America was an 
excessive expression of a vulnerability to political populism that the greater social 
stratification and political inequality of the old world was better able to check. 
 
Wakefield used the religious customs of the United States as an example of its 
peoples’ lack of intellectual independence. As he wrote, ‘A wandering preacher in 
America does not create, but only supplies, a demand for his services; visiting thinly-
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peopled districts, not with a view to delude the scattered inhabitants, but because he 
knows that they already long for his presence, that they are waiting for a dose of 
superstitious terror.’ Wakefield’s source for this is, as with so much of England and 
America, was Trollope’s Domestic Manners of the Americans (1832). As Trollope 
observed of the charismatic power of preachers, ‘My residence in the country has 
shewn me that a religious tyranny may be exerted very effectually without the aid of 
the government, in a way much more oppressive than the paying of tithe, and without 
obtaining any of the salutary decorum, which I presume no one will deny is the result 
of an established mode of worship.’55 Trollope’s emphasis here reminds us that it is 
the dispersed, egalitarian nature of settler society that endangers the independence of 
its citizens.  
 
The low population density of colonies also added to the tension between the global 
vision of the colonizer and the sentimental parochialism of the settler. As Wakefield 
wrote, ‘Nearly all people born in dispersed colonies, are fanatically proud of their 
own wild country, and love to disparage the rest of the world. This narrowness of 
mind, arising from ignorance, seems proper to the barbarous conquerors of China; 
but, in colonies planted by the most civilized nations, it is a degenerate sentiment, a 
step backwards from civilization to Barbarism.’56 The use of the trope of oriental 
despotism reminds us that Wakefield advocated colonization as the spread of an 
essentialized European civilization. The China analogy, as in much contemporary 
economic writing, was intended to invoke a stationary society.
57
 Wakefield used ‘the 
orient’ as an extreme comparator to sharpen the contrast between the potential 
fecundity and freedom of ‘advanced’, commercial societies and the subservience and 
stagnation of older types. 
 
The settler’s inability to retain the trappings of civilization is an illuminating starting 
point for assessing Wakefield’s vision of indigenous peoples. Wakefield’s relative 
silence on this issue in the context of Canada and South Australia and his vacillating 
policy on the Maoris confirm that his position on indigenous land rights was always 
secondary and expedient to the success of the settlers.
58
 Wakefield certainly saw 
systematic colonization as a means of controlling the worst effects of settlers on 
indigenous societies. As he wrote in a prospectus for New Zealand, ‘the common 
effect… of mere colonization has been to exterminate the aboriginal race. This, 
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however, is not a plan of mere colonization: it has for its object to civilize as well as 
to colonize.’59 During the constitutional crisis of the early 1850s, Wakefield’s vague 
plans for assimilation gave way to support for settler claims in the face of criticism 
from the Aboriginal Protection Society
60
. As in other parts of the British empire, as in 
French Algeria, government was called upon to curb settler rights in the interests of 
honouring landholding agreements with indigenous peoples and preventing squatting 
and other forms of unauthorized European expansion.
61
 In Wakefield’s vision, 
indigenous peoples had the potential to disrupt the advance of settler society to the 
extent that they represented an alternative social order.  
 
The case for intervention in relations between settlers and indigenous peoples 
stemmed from the need to impose order on the population. This is made plain in New 
Zealand, which contains a history of European settler colonialism. In this account, the 
barbarity of the settler did not simply lead to a stagnating society of uncultivated 
lands and minds.  Writing of the few European settlers and ship’s crews that visited 
New Zealand before formal British sovereignty was declared, he observed, ‘Imagine 
that the laws were suspended in England for a month! By imagining this, it will be 
understood that the runaway convicts are not the only class of British subjects who 
prove a curse to the natives.’62 Not only in his polemical literature but also in his 
correspondence (notably regarding squatters in Maori land), Wakefield saw that direct 
relations between Europeans and Maoris, unmediated by government control, would 
further the tendency to civilizational decline inherent in making new settlements. 
 
Wakefield’s settler was a paradoxical figure in the story of imperial expansion: a 
representative and harbinger of superior civilization, deprived of that material culture 
and those political structures that ultimately made the individual civilized. 
Wakefield’s underlying suspicion about the settler’s susceptibility to political atavism 
is central to his thought. What, in Wakefield’s view, would save the settler from this 
fate? If the loss of civilization was a danger, it was one that certain peoples, or to use 
his language ‘races’ were more susceptible to than others. While ‘race’ was steadily 
accruing the meanings that it would have later in the century, for Wakefield as for 
John Stuart Mill, it had a meaning closer to ‘nation.’ In Wakefield’s view the success 
of colonization depended on the superiority of the ‘British’ or Anglo-Saxon race. As 
he wrote in the Art of Colonization:  
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I doubt whether a purely Milesian-Irish or Celtic-French colony, however 
well it should be governed, would be anything like as good a customer of its 
mother-country, as a purely English or Lowland Scotch colony... The 
United States of America, which have been chiefly colonized by English 
blood, are the best customers a mother-country ever had.
63
 
 
Wakefield’s deployment of race is an important dimension of his view of what 
constituted a model prosperous colony. When he came to present the bulk of the 
French population of Lower Canada as an uneducated, obstreperous peasantry, he 
noted that the majority had come from Brittany – which is to say they were ‘Celtic.’64 
His use of phrases such as ‘Celtic French’ or ‘Milesian-Irish’, reminds us of the extent 
to which white national identities were fragmented, overlapping and highly politicized 
in the period he wrote. As has been widely noted the connexion between ideas of race 
and a permanent underclass of the rural poor was a key feature of much British 
writing about the Irish in the colonies in this period.
65
 While Peter Mandler has 
suggested environmental rather than biological explanations of racial difference were 
far more prevalent than is assumed in the Victorian era, the evidence must always 
remain ambiguous and Wakefield is a case in point. In spite of the institutional and 
religious explanations for the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon found in the Durham 
Report and a few other instances, his explanations are never detailed or closely 
grounded in a particular tradition. Certainly, this vagueness supports Catherine Hall’s 
observation that the biological racism so prominent in the 1860s merely elaborated a 
well-established language. Moreover, while colour was a prominent marker of 
eligibility for rights in much settler discourse, Wakefield’s preference for the Anglo-
Saxon was more exacting in terms of racial or national homogeneity. The supposed 
failure of Irish pauper immigration to the United States and Canada is a good example 
of this
66
. The sort of social engineering necessary to systematic colonization revealed 
a belief that the kinds of institutional freedoms that Britons and neo-Britons could 
benefit from depended on a historic national precedent. This is consistent with his 
desire to export and entrench social hierarchies in the colonies. 
 
For Wakefield, like Tocqueville, settler societies required widespread political 
participation to survive.
67
 The political structure should limit the powers of the 
executive branch of government (the metropole-appointed governor) and nurture local 
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government and associations of citizens.
68
 Significantly, the Durham report of 1839 
suggested that British history itself proved the folly of separating executive and 
legislative power: ‘This entire separation of the legislative and executive powers of a 
state is the natural error of governments desirous of being free from the check of 
representative institutions. Since the revolution of 1688, the stability of the English 
constitution has been secured by that wise principle of our Government which has 
vested the direction of the national policy, and the distribution of patronage, in the 
leaders of the Parliamentary majority.’69 Crucially the sanction for this system was the 
stability and efficacy of old institutions (which should therefore be transplanted to the 
new society of the colony). The report goes on to note: ‘There seems, indeed, to be an 
idea, that the character of representative institutions ought to be thus modified in 
colonies; … that the officers of Government should be nominated by the Crown, 
without any reference to the wishes of the community, whose interests are intrusted to 
their keeping… But, if there be such a necessity, it is quite clear that a representative 
government in a colony must be a mockery, and a source of confusion.’70 The report 
distinguished responsible government (where the executive is formed by members of 
the colony), from mere ‘representative government’ where the substantive executive 
power resides in an appointee of the metropole. Wakefield felt that the latter fomented 
resentment and had actually been a cause of the revolt in Upper Canada.
71
 During the 
constitutional debate in the First New Zealand Parliament of 1854, Wakefield 
defended the principles of responsible government clutching a copy of the Report in 
his hand. ‘Not so very long ago’ he said, ‘it was the fashion in England, and 
especially in Downing Street, to say that the British Constitution is all very well for 
the people at home who understand it, but it is totally unfit for the purpose of colonial 
government. Instead of contraverting that doctrine, I will state a fact. It is that now, in 
every one of the colonies of England which enjoys full presentation, which has a 
house of representatives without admixture of nominees, which is occupied entirely or 
chiefly by people of the British race, the British constitution, including ministerial 
responsibility is in full force.’72 The Durham report and the New Zealand 
constitutional debate of 1854 were flashpoints in the history of metropole-colony 
relations that exposed the importance of political independence for the colony. While 
distance from the metropole was an argument in favour of local representative 
government, the emphasis here was on government according to British standards 
because this was the only government appropriate for Britons. 
  19 
 
A key feature of a transplanted British society was a balance between males and 
females. Younger couples were desirable colonists not only for their ‘procreative 
power’. They had the right mentality for a colony. ‘The natural time of marriage… is 
one when the mind is most disposed to hope, to ambition, to undertakings which 
require decision and energy of purpose.’73 Crucially, Wakefield felt this would 
provide a moral spur to action absent in the male-dominated society so typical of new 
colonies: ‘Each female would have a special protector from the moment of her 
departure from home. No man would have any excuse for dissolute habits.’74 This 
statement, which first appeared in England and America and was quoted in many of 
his later publications, marks a crucial difference between the old and new societies 
that Wakefield imagined. Harriet Martineau would also take up this aspect of 
Wakefield’s thought.75 A flourishing colony depended on the established social 
structures of the old society mixed with a disproportionate dose of the vitality of 
youth. 
 
Social inequality was the most significant aspect of life in the mother country which 
free migration to the settler colonies would not guarantee. As he wrote, ‘a sufficient 
price  [for land]… makes the colony as attractive as possible, both to capitalists and to 
labourers; and not merely to these, but also, by bestowing on the colony the better 
attributes of an old society, to those who have a distaste for the primitive condition of 
new colonies heretofore.’76 This was essential to avoid the lack of cultural and 
scientific achievement that the history of the United States seemed to portend: 
‘Literary men, men of science, philosophers, do not emigrate to new countries where 
their acquirements would be neither rewarded nor admired.’77 Even celebrators of 
American democracy such as Tocqueville noted the disagreeable plainness of 
American manners brought about by social equality. In Capital, Marx agreed with 
Wakefield’s premise that abundance of land had made it possible for most people to 
own capital.  They differed in their conclusions. ‘Think of the horror!’ Marx 
sarcastically observed, ‘The excellent capitalist has imported bodily from Europe, 
with his own good money, his own competitors! ... In ancient civilized countries the 
labourer, though free, is by a law of Nature dependent on capitalists; in colonies this 
dependence must be created by artificial means.’78 Marx’s critique affirmed 
Wakefield’s premise, that the large estates, urbanization and capital concentration that 
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engendered modern capitalist society would not naturally occur under conditions of 
unplanned emigration to new colonies.  
 
V 
My reading of Wakefield has shown that the growth of settler colonialism prompted 
new understandings of the role of the citizen and the state in those societies. In part 
this was necessitated by the physical situation, beyond the confines of the ‘mother 
country’. While the political subject under settler colonialism has been contingent 
upon concepts of race and class associated with nationalism or imperialism, it also 
reveals unique assumptions about the political capacities of the individual settler 
compared to the refined citizen of the metropole. Wakefield’s importance lies in the 
fact that he built the sovereignty of settler states not on an assertion of their vitality 
and strength but on a fear of their fragility. Settler society at its best was new not in 
kind but scale. Wakefield reveals the insecurity about European civilization that 
underpinned settler state formation in the 1850s and 1860s.  
 
At the same time, Wakefield’s shifting position in the power relations of settler 
colonialism provides an important insight into how the disparate sources that 
constituted the colonizer sanctioned the detrimental implications of settler sovereignty 
discourses (meaning at worst genocide of indigenous peoples).
79
 As Lauren Benton, 
among others, has demonstrated the degree to which the operation of imperial power 
is comprehensible in terms of the action of ‘the state’ is made uncertain by the 
delegated authority of colonial entities, including chartered bodies such as the New 
Zealand Company, the law courts and the army.
80
 In spite of its relative failure in 
peopling the colonies, ‘systematic colonization’ constituted a discourse of the 
colonizer, distinct from the discourse of the settler and the pragmatism of the Colonial 
Office, at least in the early Victorian era.
81
 
 
These observations have two main implications. Firstly they show that promoting 
national sovereignty for settler societies was seen as a method of imposing western 
order and civilization on those people who were supposed to deliver it. After all, 
Wakefield is considered as a founding figure in three different countries. While the 
discourse of Anglophone settlers demanded their rights to the privileges of British 
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subjects, Wakefield thought that these settlers could not be civilized without such 
rights. Crucially, Wakefield insisted that the proper exercise of those rights also 
required grounding in the historical conditions that created them. If exclusion of 
racially unsuitable subjects was essential for the prosperity of Anglophone society, so 
too was the enforced inclusion of those who would constitute it. If property rights and 
legal capacity have been central to liberal discourses of exclusion of indigenous 
peoples, so too has the supposed the fragility of western notions of civilization and 
order. Anxieties about the strength of western civilization justified Britain as a 
colonizing metropolitan authority in approving the sovereign territorial claims of its 
settler states. Analysis of figures such as Wakefield provides a transnational, 
historically contingent way of understanding settler-state formation. As such it 
undermines the ‘given-ness’ of those settler claims that underpin the states that 
emerged from the nineteenth century Anglophone colonies. It does so by exposing the 
integral role that the institution of citizenship has played in the rapid spread and 
entrenchment of settler states. 
 ‬ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The distinction between settler colonialism and imperialism in general is made in Z. 
Laidlaw ‘Breaking Britannia's Bounds? Law, Settlers, and Space in Britain's Imperial 
Historiography.’ The Historical Journal, Vol. 55, No. 3 (2012), p. 817; J. Belich, 
Replenishing the Earth. The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 
1783-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
2
 A. Lester, ‘Race and Citizenship’ in Martin Hewitt (Ed.), The Victorian world 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 382; R. Nichols and J. Singh (Eds.), 
Freedom and Democracy in an Imperial Context: Dialogues with James Tully 
(London: Routledge, 2014). 
3
 E F. Isin, Citizens Without Frontiers (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), pp. 108-111. 
4
 E. G. Wakefield, A Letter from Sydney (London: J. Cross, 1829), p. iii. 
  22 
                                                                                                                                           
5
 D. Bell, Duncan, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State: Isopolitan Citizenship, Race and 
Anglo-American Union’. Political Studies, Vol. 68, 2 (2014), pp. 418-434. 
6
 B. Honig, “[Un]Dazzled by the Ideal?”: James Tully and the New Realism” in R. 
Nichols and J. Singh (Eds.), Freedom and Democracy in an Imperial Context, p.73. 
7
 A. Smith, ‘Indigeneity, Settler Colonialism, White Supremacy’. Global Dialogue 
Vol. 12, No. 2 (2010) [Accessed on 1 May 2013 at: 
http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=488]. 
8
 L. Veracini, Settler Colonialism: A theoretical overview (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010) p. 55; R. Nichols and J. Singh (Eds.), Freedom and Democracy in 
an Imperial Context, p.1. 
9
 J. Evans, P. Grimshaw,  D. Philips and S. Swain, Equal Subjects, Unequal Rights: 
Indigenous Peoples in British Settler Colonies 1830-1910 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2003), p. 76. 
10
 J. Belich, Replenishing the Earth, p.459. 
11
 A. L. Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality 
and the colonial order of things (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), p. 40. 
12
 R. Grant, Representations of British Emigration, Colonisation and Settlement: 
Imagining Empire, 1800-1860 (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 18. 
13
 The settler is therefore distinct from Albert Memmi’s figure of the colonialist who 
operates as an officially employed member of the colonial bureaucracy, carrying out 
the mission of the colonizer; The Colonizer and the Colonized (London: Earthscan, 
1990), p. 137.  
14
 E. G. Wakefield & J. Ward, The British colonization of New Zealand: being an 
account of the principles, objects and plans of the New Zealand Association (London: 
Parker & Son, 1837), p. 7. 
15
 Ibid., p. 42. 
16
 A. Lester, ‘Race and Citizenship.’ 
17
 J. Belich,‘How much did institutions matter? Cloning Britain in New Zealand’ in J. 
P. Greene (ed), Exclusionary Empire: English Liberties Overseas, 1600-1900 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
18
 J. Ajzenstat and P. J. Smith (eds.), Canada’s Origins: Liberal, Tory, or 
Republican? (Ottowa: Carleton University Press, 1995). 
19
 A. Shaw, Great Britain and the Colonies, 1815-65 (London: Methuen, 1970); D. 
Winch, Classical Political Economy and Colonies (London: Bell and Sons, 1965). 
20
 M. Milgate and S. C. Stimson, After Adam Smith: a century of transformation in 
politics and political economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 6, 
109. 
21
 E.G. Wakefield, New Zealand, p. 34. 
22
 R. Grant, Representations of British Emigration, pp. 46-7. 
23
 A. Smith, Wealth of Nations, Books IV–V (London: Penguin, 2006), p. 22 
24
 K. O’Brien, ‘Colonial Emigration, Public Policy and Tory Romanticism, 1783-
1830’ in Lineages of Empire: The Historical Roots of British Imperialist Thought, ed. 
D. Kelly, (Oxford: Oxford, 2009), p. 69. 
25
 The literature on this topic is vast and growing; see for example, J. P. Greene, 
Exclusionary Empire, p. 7; P. Brantlinger, Victorian Literature and Postcolonial 
Studies (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009) p. 59. 
26
 B. Hall, Travels in North America, Volume 1,  (Edinburgh: Cadell, 1827), p. 14; F. 
Trollope, Domestic Manners of the Americans (London: Penguin, 1997), p. 216. 
27
 E.G. Wakefield & J. Ward, New Zealand, p. 6. 
  23 
                                                                                                                                           
28
 Horton remains under-researched. For a discussion of Wilmot-Horton’s activities in 
the 1820s see R.N. Ghosh, ‘The Colonization Controversy: R.J. Wilmot-Horton and 
the Classical Economists,’ A. Shaw (ed.), Great Britain and its Colonies, pp. 111-
117; Donald Winch, Classical Political Economy, pp. 151-169. 
29
 R. Wilmot-Horton, ‘Answers to Lord Palmerston's Questions’, 5 December 1829 in 
D3155/ WH 2856, Wilmot-Horton Papers, Derbyshire Records Office, UK (hereafter 
DRO). 
30
 R. Wilmot-Horton,  ‘Extract from Mr Butler's journal’ n.d  in D3155/WH 2865, 
DRO. 
31
 Letter from R.Wilmot-Horton to J.Thomson, 29 January 1831 in D3155/WH3019, 
DRO. 
32
 R. N. Ghosh, op. cit. 
33
  R. Owen, Report to the County of New Lanark (Glasgow: Constable & Co, 1821), 
p. 14. 
34
 Lord Palmerston to R. Wilmot-Horton, 24 February 1826 in D3155/WH 2864, 
DRO. 
35
 R. Owen to R. Wilmot-Horton, 24 January 1831 in D3155/WH 2854, DRO. 
36
 K. O’Brien correctly notes that Wakefield deliberately disguised his intellectual 
debt to Horton. However, while Horton was concerned that prospective emigrants 
should be selected for likelihood to work well and thrive in the colony, Wakefield was 
dramatically more exacting; ‘Colonial Emigration’, p.165. 
37
 ‘New theory of colonization’, Edinburgh Review (1840), Vol. 71, p. 525. 
38
 M. Edgworth to Robert Wilmot-Horton, 4 September 1826 in D3155/WH2793, 
DRO. 
39
 E. Kittrell, ‘The development of the Theory of Colonisation in English Classical 
Polticial Economy’ in A. Shaw (ed.), Great Britain, p. 59. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Handbill dated 12 May 1830, ROOC244, held at the National Cooperative 
Archives, UK. 
42
 D. Winch, Classical Political Economy, p. 90. 
43
 H. Pappé, ‘Wakefield and Marx’ in A. Shaw (ed.), Great Britain, p. 200. 
44
 E. G. Wakefield, The British Province of South Australia (London: Knight, 1835), 
p. 5. 
45
 E. G. Wakefield, A Letter from Sydney, p. 175. 
46
 E. G.Wakefield to J.R. Godley, 7 June 1851, Item 82 in Wakefield Papers, 
facsimile of papers held at Canterbury Museum, held at the University of Edinburgh 
Library, UK (hereafter ‘Canterbury MS’). 
47
 E.G. Wakefield, A Letter from Sydney, p. 68. 
48
 E.G. Wakefield to J. R. Godley, 7 June 1851, Item 82, Canterbury MS. 
49
 Ibid., p. 53. 
50
 Quoted in A. Shaw, Great Britain and the Colonies, p. 23. Duncan Bell has 
illustrated the importance of ‘colonies’ as a problem in nineteenth century political 
thought, though more could have been said of the implications of the fear of 
civilizational degeneration; see ‘John Stuart Mill on Colonies’, Political Theory, 
38(1) (2010), pp. 34–64. 
51
 See for example the famous introductory preface on medieval Europe in W. 
Robertson, History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles (London: Routledge, 1996 
[1769]). 
52
 E.G. Wakefield, England and America (London: Richard Bentley, 1833), p. 323. 
  24 
                                                                                                                                           
53
 A prominent nineteenth century relic of this approach is James Mill’s History of 
British India with its admonition of political power of entrenched ‘priestcraft’; on this 
aspect of the historic link between citizenship and orientalism see J. Harrington, 
‘Orientalism, political subjectivity and the birth of citizenship between 1780 and 
1830’, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 16, Issue 5-6 (2012), pp. 573-586 
54
 For the European context see J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 14-15, 119. 
55
 F. Trollope, Domestic Manners of the Americans, p. 85. 
56
  E.G. Wakefield, England and America, p. 326. 
57
 M. Milgate & S.C. Stimson, After Adam Smith p. 191. 
58
 E. Olssen, ‘Mr. Wakefield and New Zealand as an Experiment in Post-
Enlightenment Experimental Practice’ in New Zealand Journal of History 31 (2) 
(1997), p. 213.  
59
 E.G. Wakefield, New Zealand, p. 42. 
60
 Evans et al, Unequal Rights, p.76. 
61
 J. Ruedy, Modern Algeria (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992) p. 73. 
62
 E.G. Wakefield, New Zealand, p. 30, 
63
 E.G. Wakefield, A View of the Art of Colonization (London: John W. Parker, 1849), 
p. 84. 
64
 E.G. Wakefield, Art of Colonization, op. cit. 
65
 P. Brantlinger, Victorian Literature and the Postcolonial, p. 36. 
66
 E.G. Wakefield, Art of Colonization, p. 87. 
67
 A. Shaw, Great Britain, p. 56. 
68
 J. P. Greene, Exclusionary Empire, p. 19. 
69
 J. G. Lambton, Report on the Affairs of British North America [The Durham 
Report] (House of Commons: London, 1839), Vol.2, p. 79.  
70
 The Durham Report, p. 88 
71
 Nelson Examiner and New Zealand Chronicle, 2 June 1854, p 2 [Accessed on 20 
January 2013 at: http://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/cgi-bin/paperspast]. 
72
 P. Edmonds, Urbanizing Frontiers: Indigenous Peoples and Settlers in 19
th
 Century 
Pacific Rim Cities (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), p. 65. 
73
 E.G. Wakefield, South Australia, p. 109. 
74
 Ibid., p. 110. 
75
 C. Hall, 'Imperial Careering at Home: Harriet Martineau on Empire' in A Lambert 
and A. Lester (Eds.) Colonial Lives Across the British Empire. Imperial Careering in 
the Long Nineteenth Century, (2006) pp. 335 - 35. 
76
 E.G. Wakefield, England and America, p. xx. 
77
 E.G. Wakefield, A Letter from Sydney, p. 240. 
78
 K. Marx, Capital: a critique of political economy (London: C.H Kerr & Co., 1915), 
p. 844. 
79
 D. A. Moses, Empire, Colony and genocide (London: Berghahn Books, 2008), p. 
xv. 
80
 L. Benton,  A Search for Sovereignty :  Law and Geography in European Empires, 
1400-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 195. 
81
 A. Shaw, Great Britain, p. 19. 
